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United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, 136 U.S. 1954, (June 13, 2016)
Lillian M. Alvernaz
The epidemic of domestic violence committed against Native
American women and the jurisdictional maze these women are forced to
navigate for justice is an unfortunate reality created by gaps in laws
between sovereigns. In an effort to curb this violence, the 2005
reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act enacted 18 U.S.C. §
117(a), the habitual offender provision.1 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in
favor of the Sixth Amendment over the unreliability of uncounseled
tribal court convictions created a circuit split, thus the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari for resolution.2 The Court held that
when tribal court convictions occur in proceedings that comply with
ICRA, and thus are “valid when entered, use of those convictions as
predicate offenses in a § 117(a) prosecution does not violate the
Constitution.”3
I. INTRODUCTION
United States v. Bryant establishes the permissibility of using
uncounseled tribal court convictions to initiate the felony element of the
recidivist habitual offender provision statute, 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).4 A
“‘complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law’ governing Indian
country, has made it difficult to stem the tide of domestic violence
experienced by Native women.”5 Congress has restricted tribal courts’
sentencing authority for criminal laws against Indian defendants.6 When
the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) was enacted in 1968, tribes were
only able to sentence an Indian defendant to a maximum of one year of
imprisonment.7 Since the enactment of ICRA, Congress has expanded
the sentencing authority of tribal courts, “allowing them to impose up to
three years’ imprisonment, contingent on adoption of additional
procedural safeguards.”8 However, only a small number of tribes have
employed this enhanced sentencing authority.9 In the absence of tribal

1.
United States v. Bryant, 136 U.S. 1954, (June 13, 2016).
2.
Id. at *1964.
3.
Id. at *1957.
4.
Id. at *1962.
5.
Id. at *1959 (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 (1990)).
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Id. (citing 25 U.S.C § 1302(a)(7) (2012)).
9.
Id. (citing TRIBAL LAW AND POLICY INST., IMPLEMENTATION
CHART: VAWA ENHANCED JURISDICTION AND TLOA ENHANCED SENTENCING,
available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/download/VAWA/VAWAImplement
ationChart.pdf (last visited June 19, 2016)).
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sentencing authority, states have been “unable or unwilling” to fill the
enforcement gap.10
The habitual offender provision was included by Congress in the
2005 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”)
“in response to the high incidence of domestic violence against Native
American women.”11 Section 117(a)(1) states that “any person who
‘commits a domestic assault within . . . Indian country’ and who has at
least two prior final convictions for domestic violence rendered ‘in
Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings . . . shall be fined . . . ,
imprisoned for a term of not more than five years, or both.’”12 Two prior
tribal court convictions for domestic violence crimes thus serve as “a
predicate of the new offense.”13
It is well established that the use of a conviction in violation of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot be used in a later case
“either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense.”14
Using a prior conviction that violated the Sixth Amendment would cause
a defendant to “suffer anew” the previous violation of the right to
counsel.15A previous uncounseled conviction consistent with the Sixth
Amendment, however, is valid to enhance punishment in a later
proceeding.16
ICRA controls tribal court proceedings, according a “range of
safeguards to tribal-court defendants ‘similar, but not identical, to those
contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.’”17
Specifically, ICRA only requires indigent defendants a right to appointed
counsel for sentences of imprisonment of more than one year.18
Compliance with ICRA’s right to counsel is not consonant with that of
the Sixth Amendment.19
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondent Michael Bryant, Jr. holds a criminal record that
includes more than 100 convictions in tribal court, including numerous
misdemeanor domestic assault convictions.20 Bryant, an enrolled member
of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, lived on the Northern Cheyenne
10.
Id.
11.
Id. at *1957 (citing Violence Against Women and Department of
Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162 §§ 901, 909, 119 Stat.
3077, 3084 (2006) [hereinafter VAWA Reauthorization Act]).
12.
Id. at *1956.
13.
Id.
14.
Id. at *1962 (quoting Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967)).
15.
Id. (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972)).
16.
Id. (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748-49 (1994)
[hereinafter Nichols]).
17.
Id. at *1956 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,
57 (1978)).
18.
Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(2) (2012).
19.
Bryant at *1956.
20.
Id.
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reservation in Montana, during all relevant times of this case.21 Bryant
was sentenced to imprisonment for most of his convictions, but always
for less than one year.22 During Bryant’s criminal proceedings, he was
indigent and never appointed counsel.23 Bryant acknowledged all of his
previous tribal court convictions complied with ICRA because his
imprisonment never exceeded one year; therefore his convictions were
valid when entered.24
Bryant’s actions are “illustrative of the domestic violence
problem existing in Indian country.”25 In 2011, Bryant was arrested for
assaulting a woman.26 In February of that same year, Bryant “attacked his
then girlfriend, dragging her off the bed, pulling her hair, and repeatedly
punching and kicking her. . . . Bryant admitted that he had physically
assaulted this woman five or six times.”27 Three months later, Bryant
assaulted another woman with whom he was living by yelling at her and
choking her until she almost lost consciousness, and later stated that he
had assaulted this woman “on three separate occasions during the two
months they dated.”28
Domestic violence perpetrators “exhibit high rates of recidivism,
and their violence ‘often escalates in severity over time.’”29 Due to these
2011 assault convictions, a federal grand jury in Montana indicted
Bryant on “two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender, in
violation of § 117(a).”30 Represented in federal court by appointed
counsel, Bryant contended that his prior, uncounseled tribal court
convictions did not satisfy § 117(a)’s predicate offense element because
they violated the Sixth Amendment and counsel moved to dismiss the
indictment.31 The United States District Court for the District of Montana
denied Bryant’s motion, and he entered a conditional guilty plea,
reserving his right to appeal that decision.32 Bryant was sentenced to
forty six months imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently,
followed by three years of supervised release.33
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed Bryant’s conviction and directed dismissal of his indictment.34
The Ninth Circuit contended that the tribal court convictions themselves
did not violate the Constitution, and acknowledged that “the Sixth
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at *1962.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1959 (quoting United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at *1963.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(2014)).
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Amendment right to appointed counsel does not apply to tribal court
proceedings.” However, since Bryant had received terms of
imprisonment, such convictions would have violated a state or federal
court proceeding.35 Relying on United States v. Ant36, the Ninth Circuit
held, “tribal court convictions may be used in subsequent [federal]
prosecutions only if the tribal court guarantees a right to counsel that is,
at minimum, coextensive with the Sixth Amendment Right.”37 The Ninth
Circuit decided that Nichols v. United States38 only applies when the
prior conviction does not violate the Sixth Amendment’s right to
counsel, and rejected the Government’s argument that applied Nichols
requiring the opposite result.39
By negating uncounseled tribal court convictions used to
establish a prior domestic violence conviction to use § 117(a), the Ninth
Circuit created a circuit split.40 Both the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Eighth and Tenth Circuits held that “tribal court ‘convictions,
valid at their inception, and not alleged to be otherwise unreliable, may
be used to prove the elements of § 117.’”41 To resolve the circuit split,
certiorari was granted, and the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed.42 The Supreme Court held, “[b]ecause Bryant’s tribal court
convictions occurred in proceedings that complied with ICRA and were
therefore valid when entered, use of those convictions as predicate
offenses in a § 117(a) prosecution does not violate the Constitution.”43
III. ANALYSIS
A. Sixth Amendment Application in Tribal Court
The Supreme Court relied on its decision in Nichols, that
“convictions valid when entered retain that status when invoked in a
subsequent proceeding,” because “‘enhancement statutes . . . do not
change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction,’ rather, repeatoffender laws ‘penalize only the last offense committed by the
defendant.’”44 Bryant’s § 117(a) conviction punished “his most recent
35.
36.
37.

Id. (quoting Nichols, 511 U.S. at 675).
882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id. (quoting United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 677 (9th Cir.

1989)).
38.
Holding that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is “valid
under Scott (holding that the “Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants
appointed counsel in any state or federal criminal proceeding in which a term of
imprisonment is imposed”), because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when
used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction.” Nichols, 511 U.S. 783.
39.
Id. (citing Nichols, 511 U.S. at 677-78).
40.
Id. at *1964.
41.
Id. (quoting United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th
Cir. 2011)); see United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011).
42.
Bryant, at *1964.
43.
Id. at *1957.
44.
Id. (quoting Nichols, 511 U.S. at 747).
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acts of domestic assault, not his prior crimes prosecuted in tribal court.”45
The Court concluded that Bryant was not denied a right to counsel in
tribal court, and his Sixth Amendment right was honored in federal
court.46
Bryant contended that he was deprived of his right to counsel
because his prior tribal court convictions resulted in a term of
imprisonment.47 Bryant argued that Nichols would have allowed reliance
on tribal court uncounseled convictions if they had only resulted in fines,
to satisfy § 117(a)’s “prior-crimes predicate.”48 The Court, however,
could find no reason to distinguish tribal court proceedings as “less
reliable” when a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for over one
year than a fine-only tribal court conviction, stating, “no evidentiary or
procedural variation turns on the sanction.”49 The Court concluded that,
valid, but uncounseled tribal court convictions that result in
imprisonment of less than one year do not violate the Sixth
Amendment,50 because the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal
courts.51
The Court further dismissed Bryant’s reliance on Burgett v.
Texas.52 A defendant convicted in tribal court does not suffer an initial
deprivation of the Sixth Amendment, “so [Bryant] cannot ‘suffer anew’
from a prior deprivation of his federal prosecution.”53 ICRA only
requires indigent defendants have a right to appointed counsel when a
sentence exceeding one year of imprisonment is imposed.54 It was
undisputed that Bryant’s earlier tribal court convictions were valid when
entered.55 The Court concluded that because Bryant’s tribal court
convictions were not in violation of the Sixth Amendment when
obtained, “they retain[ed] their validity when invoked in a § 117(a)
prosecution; [t]hat proceeding generates no Sixth Amendment defect
where none previously existed.”56
B. Further Holdings

45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at *1958 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979)).
48.
Id. at *1957.
49.
Id. at *1966.
50.
Id. at *1957.
51.
Id. at *1958 (citing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land &
Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 326, 337 (2008)).
52.
Holding that a “conviction obtained in state or federal court in
violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot be used in a
subsequent proceeding ‘to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense.”
Burgett, 389 U.S. 109.
53.
Id. at *1957 (quoting Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115).
54.
Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012)).
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
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Bryant also argued the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment supported the assertion that tribal court judgments could not
be used as predicate offenses necessary to § 117(a).57 However, ICRA
itself guarantees “‘due process of law,’ accords other procedural
safeguards, and permits a prisoner to challenge the fundamental fairness
of tribal court proceedings in federal habeas corpus proceedings.”58 The
Court concluded that proceedings complying with ICRA “sufficiently
ensure the reliability of tribal court convictions,” and the use of those
convictions in a federal prosecution does not violate the due process right
of a defendant.59
IV. CONCLUSION
By reason of colonization and the development of federal Indian
law, the relationship between Indian nations and the federal government
is complex. “Congress’[s] purported plenary power over Indian tribes
rests on even shakier foundations.”60 Domestic violence continues to be
an ailment among Indian nations, but advocates must also be aware of
the implications this holding has on Indian defendants. United States v.
Bryant is a pivotal case in Indian law, but it comes with a price. While
Bryant is a win for tribal advocates working to combat domestic violence
within Native American communities, Indian defendants are only
afforded a right to appointed counsel under certain circumstances, and
the convictions obtained without such counsel are valid in federal court.

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at *1958.
Id.
Id.
Id.

